Countermapping Mega Hydropower Frontier: The case of Water and Land Expropriation by Poso Energy in Central Sulawesi

In early July 2026, the case of 29 fractured houses in Poso, Central Sulawesi, caused by Poso Energy’s mega hydrodam operation, finally gained clarity after research fieldwork commenced by geologists from Institut Teknologi Bandung in November 2025. The company, citing a recently published report by the Central Sulawesi Environmental Agency, stated hydrodam activities did not cause the property damage. Their claim was based on the initial water discharge from the Poso River, which borders the Sulewana village settlement, being only 531 cubic metres. Meanwhile, according to Poso Regional Government regulations, permissible water discharge from the PLTA is limited to 510 cubic metres¹. The company claimed the actual water discharged was approximately 228 to 230 cubic metres. However, the research proved that hydrodam operations were one of the three causes of land fracture in the area². In a meeting on 1 July 2026, the company promised compensation based on damage level: IDR 15 million for kerusakan berat (severe damage), IDR 7 million for kerusakan sedang (moderate damage), and IDR 3 million for kerusakan ringan (minor damage). However, Poso Energy did not explain the compensation categories further.

Although fractured land and housing damage was reported in 2021, The Solidaritas Perempuan (SP) Sintuwu Raya³, a women’s grassroots organisation based in Poso who advocated the case, reported that the fracturing has been happening since 2018, right at the start of the river dredging operation under a programme called “Poso River Improvement”. Most of the fractured houses are located in the Tarawana area, 400 metres from the PLTA-2 Poso Energy operations, and 1000 metres from the main hydrodam penstock infrastructure. The area has been a hub of hydrodam infrastructure since it was fully operational in 2019, and has been the location for the underwater and ground blasting operations, mainly in Sulewana and Saojo village.

However, land and housing fracture was not isolated. It was part of larger socioecological destruction experienced by the community across different scales and times. From land grabbing and low compensation for the farmers whose land was bought for the first infrastructure in Sulewana village since 2003, to the criminalisation and repression of the community in Peura village– located 31.2 km south of Sulewana–for resisting the high electric voltage tower development (2006-2012). Furthermore, the Wera Sulewana waterfall and river cascade diversion happened in 2005 - 2012⁴. In 2019, the riverbed dredging at the lake and river outlet had impacted the entire living ecosystem of the lake and displacing hundreds of the traditional eel trap (wayamasapi and the karamba) and destruction of the cultural bridge. It followed by the submerged farms of 18 villages around the lake after the watergate was fully opened in 2020 and the community’s fight for legal battle, to the fractured houses in the Sulewana village in 2018 due to the full operation of the hydroelectric industry. Moreover, gradual expropriation of the entire Poso hydroecology continued up to this day.

Before delving into the case study of socioecological violence that has happened across the area, the section below discusses the context of how Poso Energy has been sustaining socioecological violence through mega hydrodam development.

The development of mega hydropower dams in Poso cannot be separated from the violent conflict that unfolded in the region between 1998 and 2001. In 2001, Jusuf Kalla, a member of the Kalla family, played a key role in mediating the conflict through the Malino Declaration. At the time, Kalla served as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (2001- 2004) and would later become Indonesia’s 10th and 12th Vice President. He has since been widely recognised as a figure associated with peace and conflict resolution in Central Sulawesi.

An oligarchic family made the infrastructure of PLTA Poso Energy possible. Kalla’s main company, Bukaka Teknik Utama (established in 1978), founded Poso Energy and held concessions along the Lake Poso watershed (DAS/Daerah Aliran Sungai) from 2005 onward. The Kalla oligarch was granted land around Tentena areas in 2005, the epicenter for internally displaced refugees from Poso city due to the Poso ‘interreligious’ violent conflict that happened 1998-2003. During this time, military territorialisation peaked. In his 2005 notes, Setelah Gemuruh Wera Sulewana Dibungkam: Dampak Pembangunan PLTA Poso dan Jaringan SUTET di Sulawesi, Aditjondro describes how military and police forces backed the Poso mega hydrodam development. The new National Army (TNI-AD) forces, Battalion 714 Sintuwu Maroso of the Poso region, were deployed in 2005 with the mission of ‘enabling safety’. In reality, the effort aimed to protect natural resource extraction development.⁵

Although Poso Energy’s hydropower plant was never explicitly framed as part of post-conflict reconstruction, several phenomena indicate its sudden surge of mega development was deeply tied to economic and political interests that took shape during the conflict. The deployment of Battalion 714/Sintuwu Maroso in Poso in 2005 coincided with the concession of hydropower land, justified as a measure for civil security in the post-conflict area following the terrorist attack at the Tentena traditional market on 28 May 2005 (Aditjondro 2005). However, this action primarily served the purpose of “strategi pengamanan proyek,” or infrastructure project securitisation in the Poso area.⁶

“In early May (2025), construction of the Poso-2 hydroelectric power station project began. Before involving a number of private companies from Makassar, Soroako, Palu, Manado, and Medan, Bukaka had already recruited 16 military personnel to build the access road to the project site. These were members of the Indonesian Army’s Combat Engineering Corps (Zipur), recruited by Bukaka along with heavy machinery previously used to build the new Indonesian Army 714 Battalion/Sintuwu Maroso headquarters in Maliwuko, on the southern outskirts of Poso. They are constructing a new road leading to the project site, bypassing the village of Sulewana, thereby eliminating the need to travel along the village road to the river crossing.”

George Junus Aditjondro

Poso Energy began acquiring farmlands in 2003, before it was granted four land plots in 2005 for hydrodam development and its formal establishment on 31 May 2005. The first and second infrastructure projects were built in the villages of Saojo and Sulewana. Meanwhile, several land plots in Tampemadoro and Saojo villages were allocated to the planned third and fourth developments, which are currently undergoing the process of “land freed”, which started in 2005, and took place until the report is written. This research investigates the socioecological catastrophe caused by mega hydrodam operations, which are slowly unfolding in Poso Lake and River as a result of the development.

This hydropower plant uses a run-of-river system without a conventional dam. Water from the Poso River, the only outlet of Poso Lake, is diverted through an intake gate into an open channel and regulated in a headpond. It is then conveyed through three steel penstocks, each supplying a 65 MW turbine with a hydraulic head of 158 metres. After driving the turbines, the water discharges through an open-channel tailrace and returns to the original river channel.

The PLTA 2, their first hydrodam infrastructure construction, never had public consultation or an AMDAL (Environmental Impact Assessment), according to an interview with local CSO SP Sintuwu Raya, who is advocating for the land, as well as people in Sulewana village. There was only a public community meeting led by Edison Kawanga, former village head of Sulewana Village, on 21 July 2005, who promised 1 million watts of free electricity for the community.⁷ Many community members were unaware of the EIA document’s existence and, according to several interlocutors⁸, it was often described to them as a “secret document.”⁹

According to the Aditjondro’s personal field notes, the first material deployment began in April 2005¹⁰, roughly a month before Poso Energy was founded on 31 May 2005. At this stage, the initial infrastructure for PLTA Poso-2 was constructed in Sulewana Village, beginning in 2005, by local technical experts from Bukaka, the main shareholder of Poso Energy. Construction was completed in stages: the first Commercial Operation Date (COD 1) was reached in October 2012, with an installed capacity of 1 × 65 MW, followed by COD 2 in November 2012, adding a further 2 × 65 MW. The total installed capacity of PLTA Poso-2 therefore reached 195 MW¹¹.

The pre-construction phase of the PLTA Poso-2 development, according to the presentation document titled “civil engineering of PLTA Poso Energy 2,” involved the procurement of materials, land acquisition, excavation, construction of access roads, and infrastructure. These activities were the initial stages of the project’s development. However, notes by George Junus Aditjondro provide a different account of what happened on the ground. They describe the clearing of cultivated land and displacement of agricultural plots, along with inadequate compensation. At the time, affected residents were reportedly seeking compensation of IDR 5,000 per square metre.

“Senin, 22 Agustus 2005: Sejumlah petani pemilik tanah yang tanahnya sudah dibebaskan secara sepihak oleh Bukaka untuk jalan tembus ke PLTA Poso-1 merencanakan aksi memprotes langkah Bukaka itu, hari Senin, 15 Agustus lalu. Rencana itu sempat terendus oleh Kapolsek Pamona Utara, Iptu Dekmon Tumatole. Makanya, perwira polisi bergelar Sarjana Hukum ini menawarkan diri untuk memediasi pertemuan antara mereka dan Bukaka. Dibarengi ancaman, polisi akan menangkap orang-orang yang tetap berkeras melakukan aksi. Walhasil, aksi dibatalkan untuk sementara.

Tapi karena tidak jelas kapan mediasi Kapolsek mau dijalankan, Senin berikut, 22 Agustus lalu, para korban gusuran jalan tembus PLTA Poso-1 melakukan aksi. Delapan kepala keluarga dengan berani menghentikan alat-alat berat seperti bulldozer, excavator dan stoomwals di lokasi proyek yang mau dipakai untuk menggusur tanaman mereka, sambil menuntut supaya Bukaka membayar dulu ganti rugi tanaman mereka. Tanaman mereka terdiri dari coklat, kelapa, kemiri, kopi, cengkeh, pohon sagu, durian, vanili, langsat, mangga, rambutan, bambu, pisang, jeruk (semua jenis), pandan tikar, padi dan jagung. Mereka penasaran, karena tanah mereka diberi ganti rugi, namun semua tanam tumbuh mereka tidak.”

Catatan George Junus Aditjondro, 2005

“Pada tahun 2003 dimulai pembangunan, tanpa adanya pemberitahuan yang komprehensif dan partisipatif bermakna, lahan perkebunan masyarakat di desa khususnya Desa Sulewana dan Desa Saojo dibebaskan untuk pembangunan proyek. masyarakat yang lahannya termasuk dalam area proyek terpaksa menyerahkan lahan perkebunannya karena mereka tidak memiliki kekuatan untuk menolak proyek yang didukung oleh pemerintah yang diklaim sebagai kepentingan umum.”

SP Sintuwu Raya, 2025

The low compensation from land grabs was confirmed during fieldwork by researchers on 19 July 2026, during visits to Sulewana village, where farmland was taken and residents had to give it up because of economic pressure.

Dalam wawancara (19 Juli 2026) dalam forum diskusi mengenai kasus 29 bangunan retak (dikoordinasikan oleh SP Perempuan) yang dilakukan bersama warga Sulewana yang tanahnya digusur pada 2005, ia mengatakan bahwa tanah kebun miliknya yang terletak di sungai, dibeli dengan harga sangat murah (Rp 1,750) per meter, dan dihitung dengan perhitungan garis lurus, yang artinya tidak menghitung luasan tanah sesuai kontur.

Awalnya, ia tak mau menjual tanah tersebut, sampai akhirnya suaminya masuk rumah sakit dan ia terpaksa menerima kompensasi tersebut untuk membiayai rumah sakit.

Eliesta Handitya fieldnotes, 19 July 2026

The “construction phase” involved the construction of foundations and main structures, slope protection, and the installation of major equipment, including the river diversion operations. According to the company’s presentation deck, the river diversion was carried out in stages beginning in 2005, with the project’s key date for diversion operational mentioned in the Poso Energy civil construction presentation deck¹² dated 8 November 2010. The diversion works were also marked by extensive blasting of large rock formations around the Sulewana waterfall cascade. The water in the cascade has 40 degree slope with a total length of one kilometre¹³.

In George Junus Aditjondro’s notes¹⁴, the company began building new roads to directly access the cascade without crossing Sulewana village. In interviews with local journalists, the road is called Jalan Inspeksi, an inspection road.

Poso lake¹⁵ is Indonesia’s third-largest lake, rich in biological diversity and a source of cultural epistemologies and livelihood for people¹⁶. It formed roughly two million years ago when tectonic plate shifts created a cavern 500 m (1,640 ft) deep in Sulawesi. The Pamona Indigenous communities in Poso refer to the lake as a living being, pronounced ‘Sira’, or ‘they/them’¹⁷. However, since the arrival of Bukaka company, Lake Poso has been seen as a “live storage dam,” reducing its value as a natural being to a mere ‘natural resource’ under capitalist logic.

To understand a few kinds of socioecological violence since its first enactment, I present two case studies: the extra-high-voltage tower development, the Sulewana cascade destruction from 2006 to 2012, and submerged farmland due to the floodgate operations (2019 - current).

The Poso River Improvement was formalised through an ANDAL (Environmental Impact Analysis Report)¹⁸ in 2019, commenced with the Memorandum of Understanding with the Poso regional government.

It involves dredging Poso Lake’s outlet, covered as tourism development but actually aimed at increasing water discharge from the lake to the river for turbine operation. The project, running from 2018 to 2022, has displaced cultural heritage such as the Yondo mPamona wooden bridge and traditional eel bamboo traps (Wayamasapi). It has dredged 2,500,000 cubic metres of the river and lake bed, seriously impacting ecologies including shore sedimentation and transforming the riparian area, the custodian land of the Pamona Indigenous community, used as sand disposal.

Through an analysis of the 185-page EIA document, the assessment only identifies impacts within a 12.8 kilometres stretch from the Poso-1 Hydroelectric Power Plant regulating dam towards the lake outlet. Lake Poso itself is treated as a “boundary” rather than as a space of inquiry in the ANDAL. Meanwhile, the communities identified within the assessed impact area are Sulewana, Tendeadongi, and Petirodongi (North Pamona), as well as Pamona, Tentena, and Sangele (Pamona Puselemba). Communities living along the lake beyond these areas, including those in other districts such as Southeast Pamona, West Pamona, and East Pamona are therefore excluded from the impact analysis.

The local and Pamona Indigenous communities inhabit and live with/in the Lake Poso ecosystem. In this research, I centre the perspectives and situated knowledge of those who have lived alongside mega hydrodam extractions. Their struggles become a countermap to extraction by documenting their persistent everyday refusal and efforts to sustain the right to live before a giant extractor. Through this approach, I question myself on how to reconsider what counts as spatial evidence when the socioecological violence are rendered invisible. Is it possible to see the community voice as fragments that arrange collective (spatial) memories, and how to make it operative as ways to organise struggle?

The facilitation cards are developed to collectivise knowledge, allowing communities to exercise agency in opening and guiding their own conversations with prompts. It includes the illustrated map that is designed as a play mat in which community members can place their feelings, memories, and experiences as the cards are used in collective discussions.

The facilitation card game also creates a counterforum, a space where collective memories and living space erased, displaced, or flattened by dominant power, can be reclaimed.